How Fascist was Austrofascism?

Was the Austrian interwar regime a fascist regime? This essay suggests that we need to change the question.

How Fascist was Austrofascism?
Vaterländische Front rally in Vienna, 8 Oct 1936

DISCLAIMER: This essay was written as part of my MA degree at University College London in 2017 and has neither been edited nor peer-reviewed.

In February 2010, 97 historians, political scientists and social scientists sent an open letter to the Austrian president, government and all members of parliament. In their letter, the scholars petitioned the Austrian political establishment to right a great injustice of history and introduce a law for the rehabilitation of the victims of the Austrian interwar regime led by chancellors Engelbert Dollfuß and Kurt Schuschnigg.[1] From 1934 to 1938, this dictatorship led by the Christian Social Party (CSP) had violently suppressed and interned thousands of its political opponents. Although prominent figures of the post-war republic, such as Social Democratic chancellor Bruno Kreisky, had been imprisoned under the interwar regime, the crimes committed by the Nazis after the Anschluss in 1938 had  eclipsed this part of Austrian history after the end of the war.

The reception of the letter unveiled the continued existence of a fundamental rift in Austrian society, even 70 years on. The political right and conservatives were reluctant to condemn the regime, in particular the members of the Christian Democratic ÖVP who saw their party as the successor of the CSP and to day this day have Dollfuß’s portrait hanging in their parliamentary club room.[2] Over the course of the parliamentary debates in the following months, a back-and-forth ensued about the use of the term Austrofascism for this regime: while the political left, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Greens, insisted on using Austrofascism as a label in the text of the bill, in order to ‘“plainly, precisely and unambiguously express”’ the unjust nature of the regime, the ÖVP was only willing to talk of the regime as the ‘“time after the suspension of parliamentarism in Austria”’.[3] Although the bill passed, a compromise struck between the ÖVP and SPÖ meant that the regime was neither legally described as a dictatorship nor as fascist in the end.

This episode illustrate just how contentious the use of a simple historical label can prove to be.  The political landscape of current day Austria, however, is not the only sphere in which the use of the term Austrofascism causes irritation. Historians of Austria and theorists of fascism alike have battled over the right terminology to describe the period between 1934 and 1938, since the end of the Second World War. As Wolfgang Wippermann, a leading scholar of fascism, has pointed out, the problem lies in the fact that fascism has been simultaneously used as an endonym, as an analytical concept and as a highly-charged accusation among opponents in political discourse.[4] The situation is furthermore complicated by the multiplicity of theoretical definitions that have been offered for generic fascism and the question of the direct applicability of these ideal-types to the Austrian case. In other words, it is difficult to say whether Austrofascism is a suitable term to describe Austria’s interwar regime, because historians disagree whether it ticks all the boxes of generic fascism and since they disagree what these boxes are in the first place.

The following historiographical review will therefore be conducted on two different levels: on one hand it will outline the evolution of the academic dispute over the alleged existence/non-existence of Austrofascism, that has taken placce since 1945, and on the other hand it will discuss the most influential theories of fascism in relation to this debate. Those two dimensions of analysis will be intertwined throughout and complemented with reflections on the methodological usefulness of comparisons between different national strands of fascism, as well as the possible pitfalls of continually extending conceptual typologies with an ever-growing list of subtypes that are only narrowly applicable.

The question that I am asking in the title of this essay is partially a rhetorical one: considering the extensive amount of monographs, collective volumes and articles that have been published without finding a consensus on whether the interwar dictatorship constituted Austrofascism, it would be presumptuous, but also utterly futile to think that this essay could find a concluding answer. Nevertheless, in addition to comprehensively shining a critical light on the different interpretations, the form of the question also implies a certain distance of mine to the binary oppositions that have sometimes imbued the historiographical debate: I am convinced that by asking “how” fascist Austrofascism was, one can come to a more meaningful conclusion than by asking “whether” it was fascist or not.

Due to relative obscurity of the topic, it seems appropriate, however, to begin with a succinct summary of the interwar events before delving right into the historiographical analysis.

After its defeat in World War I, the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire split into numerous successor states and Austria was established as a rump state under allied supervision in the Treaty of St. Germain. The very name of the newly-formed republic was a point of contention for the Allies, since Austrian politicians initially insisted on calling it “Deutsch-Österreich” (“German-Austria”), which sparked fears of the possibility of an ethnically-based irredentism in the former Habsburg territories and raised the spectre of possible annexation by the German Reich. This choice reflected the commonly-held belief among large swaths of the Austrian population, and politicians from all parties, that a rump Austria would be a freak nation, unable to survive on its own due to its diminutive population, its industrial power-houses being gone, and an imperial capital dominating a country without an empire. It was not in the allies' interests, however, to allow such a unification with Germany, and therefore Austria’s existence as a buffer state was cemented in the treaty.

Following an uneasy coalition between social democrats and conservatives from 1918-1920, the Christian Socials held on to power for the next decade, albeit with strong opposition, especially from the workers in “Red Vienna”. The fervent anti-marxism of the conservatives, and the irredentist Pan-German movement, who supported the CSP in parliament, led to deep tensions in politics as well as on the streets. As in other European countries, the public sphere was increasingly invaded by paramilitary militias made up of veterans: the Heimwehr (“Homeguard”) on the side of the CSP and the Republican Schutzbund (“Republican Protection League”) of the social democrats. Apart from the social democrats, the NSDAP also turned into a force to be grappled with in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 1929. As Hitler rose to power in the Reich and the Austrian Nazis gained electoral traction, the CSP’s options to retain power began to wane.

In 1933, an electoral stalemate looked increasingly likely and chancellor Dollfuß seized the opportunity of a hung vote, and the following resignation of all three parliamentary presidents out of party-political considerations, to declare that parliament had eliminated itself. Invoking war-time rule by decree, Dollfuß dissolved parliament, introduced censorship, banned the opposition and imposed a new constitution transforming Austria from a democracy to a corporatist Ständestaat. Furthermore, he banned the Schutzbund, which led to the violent clashes of the so-called Civil War in February 1934 and the re-introduction of the death penalty.

After the social democrat uprising had been quelled, the NSDAP attempted an unsuccessful putsch in July, killing Dollfuß in the process. His successor Schuschnigg declared Dollfuß a patriotic martyr and spun a personality cult around him, which he integrated into the mythology of the newly-formed unitary party Vaterländische Front (“Fatherland Front”). Following the increased direct interference of Hitler in Austrian affairs, the Ständestaat eventually found its end when German troops invaded Austria in 1938.[5]

The amount of labels that have been coined for the interwar regime is staggering. In the preface to his seminal collective volume Austrofaschismus, Emmerich Tálos lists but a few of those that have been conjured up over the years: ‘“corporate state”, “Homeguard fascism”, “semi-fascism”, “authoritarian regime”, “competitive fascism”, “imitational fascism”, “governmental dictatorship”’.[6] Not even included in the list is one of the first terms ever to be used specifically for the Austrian case, clerico-fascism.

Clerico-fascism was coined by Charles A. Gulick in his 1948 study Austria from Habsburg to Hitler.[7] Despite its decline in use during the last few decades, it expresses a core characteristic of the regime, which had tremendous influence on its policies, its leaders and its very self-conception: the pretence to worldly Catholic power.

Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s the CSP gradually developed an ideology that rejected the ‘conception of a democratic-pluralistic society’ and saw Catholic values and traditions as a direct template for the organisation of state and society.[8] Indeed many leading figures of CSP were themselves priests, such as Dollfuß’s predecessor Ignaz Seipel, and even Dollfuß had a career in the clergy set out for him.[9] Although he had left the seminary just before volunteering in World War I, he retained his extreme parochial piety throughout his life.

Due to the fact that Gulick was a socialist sympathiser and that his book is based to a large extent on his personal travels through Austria in the 1930s, the term “clerico-fascism” is seen as academically discredited by some.[10] Ernst Hanisch, for example is convinced that clerico-fascism represents a Kampfbegriff (a polemical accusation used to deride one’s political opponent) and not a ‘theoretically reflected “type”’, because in his mind there exists no evidence that the clergy or the Vatican had driven Dollfuß into dictatorship.[11]

This dispute about clerico-fascism’s alleged attribution of authoritarian agency to the clergy is usually connected to the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of 1931 and its direct call for the implementation of corporatism across Europe as a more Christian form of state organisation.[12] Critics of clerico-fascist interpretations assert that those interpretations ignore the encyclical’s emphasis on social values and the liberty for the population to choose their own government, and that they falsely portray the pope as dictating instructions to Austrian politicians.[13] Even Gulick, however, did not allege that: on the contrary, he states very assertively that the ‘Vatican should [not] bear any responsibility for […] the perversions by the Austrian Fascists of the spirit of Quadragesimo Anno.’[14]

More sophisticated arguments against a clerico-fascist classification consequently do not dwell on the intricate differences between clerical and catholic-conservative forms of corporatism. The fact of the matter is that ‘far from being oppressed […] the Roman Catholic Church greatly increased its influence’ and ‘“bolstered the authoritarian state with its emphasis on obedience to a higher authority”’.[15] Similarly true, however, is that ‘despite explicit supporting and legitimizing, the Catholic church retained internal autonomy and acted as a barrier against increasing radicalization’.[16] Esden-Tempska has poignantly concluded that the inclusion of the church into the wider sphere of decision-making ‘ensured the exclusion of features emphasized abroad, such as Social Darwinism and the glorification of violence.’[17]

In fact, the strongest case against clerico-fascism is indeed the comparison of Austria with other countries, such as Germany and Italy, and with the hallmarks of generic fascism extracted from these archetypes. The rampant anti-clericalism and ‘“sacralization of politics”’ in Nazism and Italian Fascism, which had at its core the substitution of established religion with a ‘political religion’ defined by violent struggle and martyrdom, as it has been conceptualised by Emilio Gentile, stand out too prominently for their lack not to be noticed in the Austrian interwar regime.[18]

Which generic definitions of fascism have been developed then and how has Austrofascism been viewed in their light? Gentile has already been mentioned and his emphasis of fascism as a civic religion is one way or another also shared by the other major theorists, such as Stanley Payne and Robert Griffin.

Payne has developed an extensive list of conditions, which need to be fulfilled in order for a movement to count as truly fascist (See Table 1). Among the ideological qualifications, which Austrofascism has clearly difficulty to pass, are the ‘attempt to realize a new modern, self-determined and secular culture’, as well as ‘the goal of empire [or] expansion’.[19]

Table 1. Typological Description of Fascism. (Source: Payne, 1995, p. 7).

The Christian Socials did not propose a renewed modern culture, but were rather firmly committed to returning to the (imagined) ideal of a parochial, medieval society. The missing element of expansionism, however, should not be attributed to a lack of will or intention. The staunch Austrian patriotism, which the CSP developed over the course of the 1920s should rather be seen as the product of external circumstances: the most pragmatic way to eliminate potential threats to their hold on power was to create a specifically Austrian nationalism in order to keep the Pan-Germans and, more importantly, the Nazis in check.

A similar conclusion could be drawn for the organisational condition of  ‘attempted mass mobilization with militarization of political relationships and style and with the goal of a mass militia’.[20] Although the Gleichschaltung of the Heimatwehr, unions, youth organisations and other associations, incorporated most of society under the banner of the Vaterländische Front, it has been alleged that many of its 2 million members existed on paper only.[21] In any case, it is more than reasonable to say that ‘the philosophy and policies of the Front were clearly designed to take the wind out of the Nazis’ sails’.[22] And “designed” can be taken in a literal sense here, since the symbolism, the rituals and even the uniforms of the Front strongly seek to emulate the aesthetic of both the Reich-NSDAP and Italian Fascism (See Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Vaterländische Front rally in Vienna, 8 Oct 1936. (Source: National Library of Austria).

The failure of the interwar regime to pass Payne’s set of tests has led him to classify the dictatorship between 1934-38 simply as ‘authoritarian nationalism’.[23] He even goes a step further and divides his classification further into ‘Radical Right’ for the Heimwehr and ‘Conservative Right’ for the CSP and the Vaterländische Front.[24] In his mind, the CSP was only forced to come up with fancy decoration for their inherently conservative project of a ‘preemptive authoritarian government’ due to the competition with the Nazis.[25]

A number of other scholars, such as Hanisch and Pauley, have also subscribed to a similar view that Austrofascism was actually ‘“imitation fascism”’ in the form of ‘authoritarianism-with-fascist-trappings’.[26] Roger Griffin has created the Fascism subtype ‘parafascism’ in order to express the same meaning: ‘a form of authoritarian and ultranationalist conservatism which adopts the external trappings of fascism while rejecting its call for genuine social and ethical revolution’.[27]

Is it really justified to reduce Austrofascism to a matter of style and theatricality, though? Pauley himself points out that the Vaterländische Front ‘made an explicit claim to totality which excluded the possibility of opposition views and in a typically fascist way [emphasis mine] built on the leadership principle (Führerprinzip)’.[28] If the single party of the authoritarian state was organised in a typically fascist way should this not imply that, at least to some degree, Austrofascism was also indeed typically fascist?

I suggest that the concept of “imitation fascism” suffers from an inherent logical paradox, which has its roots in the tendency of fascism typologies to downplay failed or incomplete fascist regimes. In other words, general theories of fascism tend to favour the ideal-types Italy and Germany, due to their search for conceptual rigidity and are therefore all too ready to discount mixed cases as non-fascist, even though it could be well said that they contain fascist elements.

In stark contrast to Payne’s extensive set of conditions, Griffin has provided us with the catchiest shorthand for generic fascism by far: he sees the essence of fascism in a revolutionary, ‘“palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism”’.[29] Approaching the Austrian interwar regime from this theoretical angle, it is indeed difficult to see how it could fit the description of a modernist project, aiming to create a “new man” and longing for an utopia built on the image of a bygone golden age. The reactionary project of the Catholic conservatives was clearly regressive and had no revolutionary aim whatsoever.

In this regard, it could be helpful to consider Gerhard Botz’s alternative approach which consists of taking a step back and using Austrofascism as an umbrella term encompassing both “Nazi fascism” and the Ständestaat fascism. Botz suggests that the ‘specific types of fascist movements in Austria developed within the Catholic-Conservative and the German national camps’ and that this ‘segmental split’ is the precise reason ‘why fascism remained factionalized’ and could therefore only participate in power subjugated to the conservative elites.[30] He identifies the Heimwehr as the actual fascists in the ‘pro-Clerical camp’, who managed to drive the Catholic Socials into adopting more and more fascist-looking policies in order to satisfy their own desire for militancy.

Fig. 2. Geneaology of Fascism in Austria. (Source: Botz, 1980, p. 194).

This is an interesting thought, since it would mean that the Heimwehr were in spirit actually closer to the Nazis than to the CSP, and that it was their split on the Pan-German issue that left them without a palingenetic vision to pursue. Since they did not want to follow the German model of fascism, they followed the Italian model instead, but the Italians had their irredentist palingenetic project of re-establishing the second Roman Empire, while the Heimwehr remained Fascists without a cause. While both movements ‘wanted to abolish democracy, destroy the labor organizations and establish, by means of violence, their one party-system’, the Heimwehr did not know how a specifically Austrian palingenetic project could look like and turned to the Catholic Socials for help. However, the attempt to unify  the Heimwehr behind the somewhat stale vision of a corporate Catholic state failed, which led them to push their conservative allies to increasingly imitate the spectacle of the Nazis. Expressed in a slightly more polemical way, one could say that there were too many fascists in Austria for one of the competing brands to succeed.

There are however, disparaging opinions on how clearly one can separate the Heimwehr from the Christian Socials. While Hanisch asserts that the conservatives treated the militia like a chained fighting dog, Ludwig Jedlicka has maintained that the Heimwehr was ‘“the sole repository of authoritarian and fascist thought”’ in the alliance.[31] Peniston-Bird in turn cautions that ‘if the distinction is drawn too strictly […] it erodes the overlap in both membership and sympathies’ between the organisations.[32]

Jill Lewis echoes this sentiment in a statement, which suggests that historians’ referral ‘to an alliance between the conservatism of the Christian Social Party and the fascism of the Heimwehr […] assumes an independence […] which did not exist.’[33] Her general argument, in combination with Thorpe’s views, serve as a good conclusion to our historiographical review, since they both propose new approaches towards Austrofascism, which move on from the standard comparative, typology-oriented way.

Lewis is adamant that the focus on ‘typological definitions or models’ can lead to a distorted, teleological view of Austrofascism. Building on Klaus-Jörg Siegfried’s insights, she highlights that if one concentrates on the ‘German characteristics of fascism and the National Socialist system imposed after 1938’, it is indeed simple ‘to isolate those aspects of the Ständestaat which differed from National Socialism and then conclude that the earlier system was not fascist’.[34] In addition, she argues that historians too readily take labels at face value in the Austrian context, so that, for example, the ‘radical populist tradition and a corporatist ideological strand’ of the CSP are left unscrutinised.[35] Lewis sees that as a fallacy of juxtaposing fascism and conservatism in binary terms, because, according to the extensive typologies of fascism, every deviation from the standard model of fascism automatically means that it is not “pure fascism”, whereas ‘“conservatism”, has received far less analytical attention and frequently lacks any definitional rigour whatsoever’ and therefore remains a catch-all term.[36]

Thorpe argues similarly that ‘the claim that nazi Germany and fascist Italy were more authentically fascist is based on superficial comparisons that ignore the deeper workings of the Austrian state.’[37] She asks the valid question, why the historiography of Austrofascism has so far been lacking any contributions from ‘social and cultural history of “everyday life”, which have enriched and refined German, French and Italian historiographies of fascism’ and could give us a more nuanced picture of in terms of ‘coercion and consent, collaboration and resistance’ in interwar Austria.[38]

Criticising the persistence of the ‘“imitation fascism”’ label, she claims that this line of argument has already been made redundant ‘by recent transnational studies of the Italian and German regimes’, which have proven sufficiently that the Nazi tourist organisation “Kraft durch Freude” was ‘itself a copy of the OND in Italy’, and that there are plenty of examples, which could undermine the validity of imitation as a distinction between “true” fascisms and variations.[39]

Finally, she suggests to adopt the methodology of Aristotle Kallis, who has proposed to view ‘the difference between “fascism” and “para-fascism” [as] a difference of degree rather than substance’.[40] Thorpe considers Kallis’ approach of treating fascism ‘as a processual category’, meaning as a process of ‘fascistization’ as a much more promising way to reach fruitful conclusions about the unique ways ‘under which traditional elites co-opted fascist groups.’

The historiographical review has shown that the ambiguity of Austrofascism actually possesses value for the advancement of fascist studies, in general. The case of the Austrian interwar regime is so complex and so abundant in interacting variables and actors, that researchers who want to get to the bottom of its nature, have to resort to innovative means in order to reach meaningful conclusions. It is my opinion that Lewis and Thorpe are absolutely spot-on in their demand for an increase in transnational approaches to radical right regimes anywhere in Europe and that the “everyday history” of Austrofascism is dangerously understudied. Establishing these methods as a staple in the examination of other authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe could result in the widespread recognition that, just like in the case of Austrofascism, several shades of Fascism can exist in the same country at the same time.

Footnotes

1. Wissenschaftliche Plattform für die Rehabilitierung der Opfer des Regimes Dollfuß/Schuschnigg [Scientific Platform for the Rehabiliation of the Victims of the Dollfuß/Schuschnigg], Open Letter, 03 February 2010 <http://albertsteinhauser.at/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/HistorikerInnenbrief.pdf> [accessed 13 April 2017]. ↩︎

2. Mayr, Peter, ‘97 Forscher kämpfen für Dollfuß-Opfer’, Der Standard, 05 February 2010 <http://derstandard.at/1263706854106/Rehabilitierung-97-Forscher-kaempfen-fuer-Dollfuss-Opfer> [accessed 15 April 2017]. ↩︎

3. ‘Austrofaschismus-Rehabilitierung noch nicht durch’, Nön.at, 28 September 2011 <http://www.noen.at/niederoesterreich/politik/austrofaschismus-rehabilitierung-noch-nicht-durch/4.936.519#> [accessed 14 April 2017]. ↩︎

4. Wippermann, Wolfgang, Faschismus: Eine Weltgeschichte vom 19. Jahrhundert bis heute (Darmstadt: Primus, 2009), pp. 8-9. ↩︎

5. See Gellott, Laura, ‘Austria’ in Blamires, Cyprian P. (ed.), World-Fascism: A Historical Encyclopaedia (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 67-71. Gellott provides one of the most structured and comprehensive overviews of the Austrian interwar period and this summary is a paraphrased shortened version of her account. ↩︎

6. Tálos, Emmerich, and Neugebauer, Wolfgang, Austrofaschismus, 6th edn. (Vienna: LIT Verlag, 1984; repr. 2012), p. 1. ↩︎

7. Penniston-Bird, Corinna, ‘Austria’ in Bosworth, R. J. B. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 434-451, p. 450. ↩︎

8. Hanisch, Ernst, ‘Der Politische Katholizismus als ideologischer Träger des “Austrofaschismus”’ in Tálos, 2012, 68-86, p. 72. ↩︎

9. Wippermann, 2009, p. 72. ↩︎

10. For the genesis of Gulick’s account See Wenninger, Florian, ‘Austrian Missions – Das Problem der politischen Äquidistanz der Forschung am Beispiel Austrofaschismus’, in Reiter-Zatloukal, Ilse, et al. (eds.), Österreich 1933–1938, Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen an das Dollfuß-/Schuschnigg-Regime (Vienna: Böhlau, 2012), 257-269, p. 7. ↩︎

11. Hanisch, 2012, p. 68. ↩︎

12. Thorpe, Julie, ‘Austrofascism: Revisiting the “Authoritarian State” 40 Years on’, Journal of Contemporary History, 45 (2010), 315–43, p. 321. ↩︎

13. Ibid., p. 322. ↩︎

14. Gulick, Charles A., Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, Vol. 2 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1948), p. 1441. ↩︎

15. Pauley, Bruce, ‘Nazis and the Heimwehr Fascists: The Struggle for Supremacy in Austria, 1918-1938’ in Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, et al. (eds.), Who were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 226-238, p. 233; Esden-Tempska, Carla, ‘Civil Education in Authoritarian Austria, 1934-1938’, History of Education Quarterly, 30.2 (1990), 189, cited in Penniston-Bird, 2009, p. 450. ↩︎

16. Penniston-Bird, 2009, p. 450. ↩︎

17. Esden-Tempska, ibid. ↩︎

18. Gentile, Emilio, ‘Political Religion: a Concept and Its Critics – a Critical Survey’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 6.1 (2005), 19–32, p. 30. ↩︎

19. Payne, 1995, p. 7. ↩︎

20. Ibid. ↩︎

21. Penniston-Bird, 2009, p. 448. ↩︎

22. Pauley, 1980, p. 234. ↩︎

23. Payne, 1995, p. 245. ↩︎

24. Ibid., p. 15. ↩︎

25. Ibid., pp. 250-251. ↩︎

26. Hanisch, Ernst, ‘Die Salzburger Presse in der Ersten Republik 1918-1938’, Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde, 128 (1988), 362 and Pauley, Bruce F., Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism (Chapel Hill: [n.p.], 1981), cited in Thorpe, 2010, p. 323. ↩︎

27. Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism (London, Pinter, 1991), p. 240. ↩︎

28. Pauley, 1980, p. 233. ↩︎

29. Griffin, 1995, p. 26. ↩︎

30. Botz, Gerhard, ‘Varieties of Fascism in Austria: Introduction’, in Larsen et. al (eds.), 1980, 192-201, pp. 193-194. ↩︎

31. Peniston-Bird, p. 439. ↩︎

32. Ibid. ↩︎

33. Lewis, Jill, ‘Conservatives and fascists in Austria, 1918–34’ in Blinkhorn, Martin (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives: the Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe (London: Routledge, 1990), 98-117, p. 108. ↩︎

34. Ibid., p. 101. ↩︎

35. Ibid., p. 103. ↩︎

36. Ibid., p. 102. ↩︎

37. Thorpe, p. 316. ↩︎

38. Ibid. ↩︎

39. Ibid, p. 324. ↩︎

40. Ibid., p. 326. ↩︎

Bibliography

Blamires, Cyprian P. (ed.), World-Fascism: A Historical Encyclopaedia (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2006).

Blinkhorn, Martin (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives: the Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe (London: Routledge, 1990).

Bosworth, R. J. B. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Botz, Gerhard, ‘Varieties of Fascism in Austria: Introduction’, in Larsen et. al (eds.), 1980, 192-201.

Gentile, Emilio, ‘Political Religion: a Concept and Its Critics – a Critical Survey’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 6.1 (2005), 19–32.

Griffin, Roger, The Nature of Fascism (London, Pinter, 1991).

Gulick, Charles A., Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, Vol. 2 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1948).

Hanisch, Ernst, ‘Der Politische Katholizismus als ideologischer Träger des “Austrofaschismus”’ in Tálos, 2012, 68-86.

Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, et al. (eds.), Who were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980).

Lewis, Jill, ‘Conservatives and fascists in Austria, 1918–34’ in Blinkhorn, Martin (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives: the Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe (London: Routledge, 1990), 98-117.

Mayr, Peter, ‘97 Forscher kämpfen für Dollfuß-Opfer’, Der Standard, 05 February 2010 <http://derstandard.at/1263706854106/Rehabilitierung-97-Forscher-kaempfen-fuer-Dollfuss-Opfer> [accessed 15 April 2017].

Pauley, Bruce, ‘Nazis and the Heimwehr Fascists: The Struggle for Supremacy in Austria, 1918-1938’ in Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, et al. (eds.), Who were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 226-238.

Reiter-Zatloukal, Ilse, et al. (eds.), Österreich 1933–1938, Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen an das Dollfuß-/Schuschnigg-Regime (Vienna: Böhlau, 2012).

Penniston-Bird, Corinna, ‘Austria’ in Bosworth, R. J. B. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 434-451.

Tálos, Emmerich, and Neugebauer, Wolfgang, Austrofaschismus, 6th edn. (Vienna: LIT Verlag, 1984; repr. 2012).

Thorpe, Julie, ‘Austrofascism: Revisiting the “Authoritarian State” 40 Years on’, Journal of Contemporary History, 45 (2010), 315–43.

Wenninger, Florian, ‘Austrian Missions – Das Problem der politischen Äquidistanz der Forschung am Beispiel Austrofaschismus’, in Reiter-Zatloukal, Ilse, et al. (eds.), Österreich 1933–1938, Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen an das Dollfuß-/Schuschnigg-Regime (Vienna: Böhlau, 2012), 257-269.

Wippermann, Wolfgang, Faschismus: Eine Weltgeschichte vom 19. Jahrhundert bis heute (Darmstadt: Primus, 2009), pp. 8-9.

Wissenschaftliche Plattform für die Rehabilitierung der Opfer des Regimes Dollfuß/Schuschnigg [Scientific Platform for the Rehabiliation of the Victims of the Dollfuß/Schuschnigg], Open Letter, 03 February 2010 <http://albertsteinhauser.at/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/HistorikerInnenbrief.pdf> [accessed 13 April 2017].

‘Austrofaschismus-Rehabilitierung noch nicht durch’, Nön.at, 28 September 2011 <http://www.noen.at/niederoesterreich/politik/austrofaschismus-rehabilitierung-noch-nicht-durch/4.936.519#> [accessed 14 April 2017].